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n the past sixty years, the international community has 
achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation in an 
impressive array of domains, entrenching important 
principles of global coexistence, securing relatively high levels of 
peace and stability, and enabling the free movement and 
exchange of goods, people, wealth, knowledge, and innovation. 
Today, however, global cooperation is failing, largely 
incapacitated in the face of pressing challenges such as climate 
change, nuclear proliferation, financial insecurity, cross-border 
mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and more.  
This failure has deep structural reasons. This is the main claim 
made by Hale, Held and Young in their excellent book, Gridlock: 
Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most.1 This 
number of Philosophy and Public Issues convenes leading scholars to 
discuss that claim and some of its most significant implications 
for political theory. 
Hale, Held and Young develop a simple but far-reaching and 
widely applicable explanatory argument—that global cooperation 
is failing due to: an increase in multipolarity following the 
!
1 Thomas Hale, David Held and Kevin Young, Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation 
Is Failing When We Need It Most (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
I 
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emergence of new world powers such as China, Brazil and India; 
the complexity of unprecedented systemic global challenges such 
as climate change and financial insecurity (among others); the 
institutional inertia that tends to block readjustments in formal 
and substantive power distributions; and a simultaneous 
fragmentation and overlap of responsibilities that makes most 
attempts at concerted global governance cumbersome and 
ultimately ineffectual.  
These factors are today slowing and sometimes blocking 
action on many important fronts. They also raise fundamental 
normative questions about the nature and objectives of 
international relations in the new millennium—thus probing 
contemporary global political theory, particularly the 
cosmopolitan wave that has dominated the field in the last four 
decades.  
 
I 
Cosmopolitanism and Global Political Theory 
Cosmopolitan philosophy has been successful in elaborating 
and defending the general ideal of universal moral equality, and in 
establishing its political relevance.2 All cosmopolitans share the 
view that each and every human being has equal moral worth and 
that such worth deserves to be taken into account by political 
institutions regardless of national, ethnic, social and religious 
affiliations and differences. There is bound to be considerable 
disagreement on the exact political implications of such moral 
!
2 See Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 103 Ethics 1 (1992), 
pp. 48–75. 
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recognition, but there is widespread consensus that it affords at 
least a minimal protection of basic human rights.3  
Cosmopolitan thinkers have also orchestrated a related attack 
on the traditional notion of state sovereignty—which saw states 
as originators of their own powers, enjoying untrammelled 
authority over their subjects,4 being wholly unaccountable for 
their abuses on subjects other than their own, and largely 
impenetrable to moral and political criticism from either within or 
without.5 All these features, cosmopolitans have argued, become 
untenable once the “fundamental unit of moral concern”6 is 
understood to be individuals and all individuals equally.  
From these premises, cosmopolitans have gone on to suggest 
alternative models of political organization for both domestic and 
global politics. At the domestic level, this has usually coincided 
with a demand for some form of principled delimitation of 
legitimate government action—typically based on some list of 
basic human rights, of individuals and populations, which no 
government could violate. At the global level, suggestions have 
ranged from a vertical dispersion of sovereignty drawing on ideas 
of subsidiarity, to proposals for the establishment of 
supranational democratic governance structures that would 
recognize the importance of accountability to the people as a 
!
3 See David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
4 David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples,” 8 Legal Theory 1, pp. 1–44. 
5 See Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
6 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.”  
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necessary step to respecting and upholding the basic commitment 
to their equal moral status.7 
Cosmopolitan thinkers have typically tended to assume that 
their suggestions for reform were actually realizable—if obviously 
not at once. They have been faithful to the idea that the 
continued development of well-functioning and normatively 
justified global governance institutions was not only desirable but 
also entirely possible. To be sure, that assumption was always 
tempered by the sobering realization that diverging national 
interests would be a constant threat to global cooperation. But 
the general perspective was that this would mainly reflect a 
motivational failure: a parochial lack of political will that would 
inhibit the pursuance of an otherwise normatively clear path. 
Accordingly, most cosmopolitans have tended to focus on 
clearing and further defining that path, and to dismiss collisions 
with reality as pertaining to “non-ideal theory,” which was not 
their subject.8  
 
II 
Gridlock 
Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most 
provides global political theory with a series of dark flashes from 
the real world of contemporary international relations, and with a 
powerful explanation of its current troubles. In so doing, it forces 
!
7 See Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti, 
eds, Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
8 For a discussion see Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative 
Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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some reconsideration of the typically cosmopolitan assumption 
of the possibility of institutional progress.   
One aspect that those who read Gridlock will notice is that it 
makes little to no reference to motivational factors. As said, the 
notion that abstract principles can generate institutions that work, 
and that if those institutions stumble and fail is due to 
shortcomings in implementation, which are in turn due to 
motivational failures, has been a typical cosmopolitan leitmotiv. 
But according to Hale, Held and Young, the main obstacles to 
global cooperation today lie in the unprecedentedly complex 
nature of the very issues that need to be confronted, and in the 
rapidly changing circumstances in which cooperation is required 
to confront them. In such a predicament, the abstract principles 
themselves may seem unable to generate functioning institutional 
regimes.  
Consider, as an example, the awkward position in which high 
aggregate but low per-capita emitting countries (including China, 
India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and others) find 
themselves today when trying to negotiate their role in global 
climate cooperation in a language that cosmopolitans would 
understand—that of human rights protection. Because these big 
emitters also host large numbers of highly vulnerable people 
whose human rights could be violated by climate change, they 
would enjoy the restrictions posed on industrialized countries by 
human rights-inspired climate governance, as these would 
prevent the deaths and suffering of many of their own citizens. 
However, they would themselves have to submit to these 
restrictions as their emissions also bring about deaths and 
suffering both within and beyond their borders. These 
restrictions would constrain their emissions, thus impeding fossil-
fuelled development paths that may in turn serve to protect the 
human rights of their citizens—or at least of more of their 
Philosophy and Public Issues – A Gridlock World 
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citizens more quickly.  In other words, high aggregate/low per-
capita emitting countries that favour human rights-inspired 
climate governance seem to have a case for appealing to universal 
principles both in order to obtain global governance 
arrangements that they recognize as morally desirable and 
justifiable, and in order to obtain a particularistic exemption from 
these very same arrangements. While in cases like these 
motivations may be faulty, the problem seems to run much 
deeper. The unprecedentedly complex nature of today’s global 
problems, and the shifting conditions of the world, make it 
possible for cosmopolitan principles to justify both a given 
governance regime and exemptions from it. That is a higher state 
of gridlock, calling into question the typically cosmopolitan 
confidence in the possibility of global institutional progress.  
Gridlock also highlights other worries. Institutions, including 
global institutions, can be functionally understood as tools to 
organize social action in order to achieve morally and politically 
desirable goals. Whatever else institutions may do, they are first 
and foremost called on to solve specific coordination problems, 
and thus make possible outcomes that can only be produced as a 
result of successful cooperation.9 Arguably, then, a necessary 
feature of a legitimate institution is that it is capable of providing 
the kinds of moral and political goods that it was instituted to 
provide. Gridlock tells us that global governance institutions today 
are, in many important cases, structurally unable to do so. Or, 
different but equally troublesome, that the sorts of goods that the 
global community needs today are not the ones these institutions 
were designed to provide (after all, the UN was created to avoid a 
third world war, not to contrast unprecedented threats like 
!
9 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
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climate change). In both cases, the legitimacy of global 
institutions is at risk of being eroded: for why accept and comply 
with institutions that do not provide the moral and political 
goods that they were created to provide?  
Cosmopolitans themselves, like most other political thinkers 
of the modern and contemporary era, have been unanimous in 
denying that political power, authority and legitimacy are God-
given. On these views, institutions are created by people and for 
people: if they fail the people who institute them, as they are 
failing them today on many important fronts, there ceases to be 
reason for these institutions to stand. Gridlock tells us that the 
current cooperation breakdown within the many policy domains 
in which global governance institutions operate is not just a bump 
on the road: rather, it has deep structural reasons. Because of 
that, a case could be made that these institutions, at least in their 
present form, have lost most if not all of their efficacy. Without 
efficacy, they could (and, according to most political modern and 
contemporary political theory, also should) progressively lose 
legitimacy as well.  
It is at this juncture that an inconvenient question arises: does 
the loss of efficacy and legitimacy of institutions that were (at 
least partly) built on cosmopolitan premises also mean that 
cosmopolitanism itself should be abandoned?  
 
III 
Cosmopolitanism for a Gridlocked World 
To counter such conclusion, a cosmopolitan thinker should 
first show that retaining a gridlocked system built on 
cosmopolitan premises is still better than losing it. She should 
then advance proposals on how cosmopolitanism should be 
Philosophy and Public Issues – A Gridlock World 
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remoulded in order to be of use for global politics in a gridlocked 
world. It is impossible to adequately confront these large 
questions here, so we shall limit ourselves to some minimal 
suggestions on how they could be confronted elsewhere.  
Those who see gridlock as a justification for bringing down 
the present system must shoulder a heavy burden of proof. If 
doubts about the quality of a system of institutions are motivated 
by the plight of the oppressed, for example,10 then one needs to 
look into the foreseeable effects on the oppressed of letting that 
system collapse. Suppose the final outcome of an 
efficacy/legitimacy crisis of global governance institutions is no 
system of global governance at all: a Westphalian world on 
steroids—with chemical and nuclear weapons, satellite-operated 
drone bombings, increasing resource scarcity, and more. A world 
like that may have potentially immense (and certainly unchecked) 
human costs, and these would certainly be paid first, foremost 
and disproportionately by the oppressed themselves.11 Obviously, 
this does not make the current system excellent or just: being 
better than nothing is not what bestows normative standing to a 
system of governance.12 However, it may be a decisive factor 
when debating what to do with that system in times of crisis. If, 
as in the example just given, the fate of the most oppressed 
members of humanity is what is at stake, then the choice between 
trying to reform the system or allowing it to collapse altogether 
must be made by taking into account the consequences that the 
!
10 See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002). 
11 See David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010), p. 148. 
12 See Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights. 
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most oppressed would have to bear in either case—and the move 
from bad to worse is no good move. 
Accepting that letting the system collapse is no good move, 
and assuming that if a system is to be normatively justifiable it 
has, at the very least, to be coherent with some of our most basic 
moral principles, how are we to go on? More precisely: what is 
the role and nature of cosmopolitanism for a gridlocked world?  
It may be suggested that the role of cosmopolitanism should 
no longer be that of providing bright ideals to ascend to, but 
rather that of avoiding dark realities we do not want to sink into. 
In other words, cosmopolitanism in a gridlocked world will still 
provide prescriptions, as it has always done, but these 
prescriptions will have to be configured given the descriptive facts 
of that world and the structural factors that explain them—not 
regardless of them. The domain of cosmopolitan thinking will thus 
no longer be ideal theory.  
A non-ideal cosmopolitanism will be less concerned with what 
moral and political outcomes we wish to achieve than with those 
we need to avoid: it will be mostly devoted to the search of 
principled ways to control the type of damages that humanity is 
in the process of inflicting upon itself (to paraphrase Judith 
Shklar).13 Another way to put the same point is this: non-ideal 
cosmopolitanism will stay faithful to the notion that all human 
beings are morally equal and thus worthy of equal political 
consideration, but it will no longer work on the assumption of 
institutional progress. It will fully acknowledge that recognizing 
the equal moral status of all human beings also entails facing the 
!
13 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., 
Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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concrete circumstances that threaten the political relevance of 
such recognition in a gridlocked world.  
An example of this approach is Leif Wenar’s work on fair 
trade.14 Traditionally, the task of cosmopolitanism in regards to 
this issue has been that of asking abstract questions: What makes 
trade fair? Should fair trade be understood interactionally or 
institutionally? Should fairness in trade be strictly related to the 
idea of the modern state? Should fair trade be grounded in the 
ideal of reciprocity? These are theoretically fascinating questions 
but providing an answer to them is clearly not going to improve 
our prospects of resolving the most pressing global injustices that 
are today connected to the trade regime—anymore than 
providing abstract theories of the nature of mind will help us cure 
brain cancer. Wenar asks a different set of questions: not “what is 
fair trade?” but rather “what kind of trade practices concerning 
which specific products are particularly pernicious for the basic 
interests of the global poor?” Wenar starts not from what trade 
should ideally be to be fair, but from what can be changed about 
specific aspects of the trade system in order to avoid some of its 
most glaringly unfair outcomes.  
In the current international trade regime, Wenar argues, at 
least when it comes to trade in natural resources “might makes 
right.” The individuals who control a territory can legally sell its 
natural resources independently from the way in which such 
control has been achieved and perpetuated in time. This 
institutionalized feature of the international trade regime 
incentivizes authoritarian forms of political organization, worsens 
the economic prospects of affected populations, and makes most 
!
14 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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citizens in middle- and high-income countries directly complicit 
in severe human rights violations affecting millions of the world’s 
most oppressed people. 
Wenar’s non-ideal approach shapes the nature of the analysis 
and of the potential solutions that he puts forward. The basic 
normative proposal suggested by Wenar is popular resource 
sovereignty. According to the latter, it is the people of a country 
who own its natural resources. What is key about this proposal is 
its moral minimalism. The view is animated by the idea that we 
should reject “might makes right”—an idea that is near the heart 
of morality itself. While going beyond “might makes right” may 
have disruptive consequences on the trade regime in its current 
form, one need not be very idealistic to accept that objective as a 
morally plausible starting point. Furthermore, popular resource 
sovereignty is intuitively powerful and explicitly supported by 
several important international legal documents. Finally, popular 
resource sovereignty is congruent with some of the most 
important political values of international society, for example the 
importance of internal and external self-determination.  
One of the main strengths of Wenar’s proposal is that the 
normative assumption he builds on are morally extremely ‘thin’ 
and, for that reason, all the more solid. Another strength of 
Wenar’s proposal is that it constantly strives to individuate 
political feasibility paths—by, for example, checking for the 
compatibility of suggested policy reforms with the wider 
regulatory system (including the WTO), by individuating real-
world actors that would benefit from the proposed reforms, by 
considering the strategic implications for the foreign policy of 
some of the most important players in world politics, and by 
suggesting ways of minimizing the potential adverse impacts of 
policy reforms on stability and economic welfare.  
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These are the strengths of non-ideal cosmopolitanism, to be 
further developed in a highly complex, gridlocked world: 
theoretical make-do and focus on practical deliverance. Non-ideal 
cosmopolitanism starts not from what we should hope for but 
from what we can and cannot live with; and then focuses on how 
to concretely achieve what can concretely be achieved. This is not 
to abandon principles and aspirations but to show awareness that 
sequencing, too, is a central feature of moral progress, particularly 
when the reality in which that progress is to be pursued has 
become disorientingly complex; and that genuine moral concern 
must ultimately deliver morally valuable results, not just well-
articulated theory. For that reason, it can dictate priorities that do 
not necessarily reflect the traditional scheme ‘idealize first, realize 
later’.  
Non-ideal cosmopolitanism will advise a rebalancing of the 
kind of priorities that political theorists take to be relevant in their 
work. This is probably the most powerful lesson that political 
theorists should draw from Gridlock. There is no accurate, 
plausible or useful political theory that ignores structural facts 
about the world we live in, and which does not strive to identify 
the relevant stakeholders and feasible institutional paths for the 
kind of morally motivated changes that it suggests. This does not 
mean that all searching for a glimpse of perfect cosmopolitan 
justice (or similar lofty ideals) should stop: but it does mean that 
such search should not be the main, let alone the only concern 
that a cosmopolitan political theory should have. Even if 
imagining perfect justice is part of the cosmopolitan 
philosophical mission, it may not necessarily be the most urgent 
or even the most important task for cosmopolitans to take up in 
a gridlocked world. 
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